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DERANDOMIZATION IN GAME-THEORETIC PROBABILITY
KENSHI MIYABE AND AKIMICHI TAKEMURA
Abstract. We give a general method for constructing a deterministic strategy
of Reality from a randomized strategy in game-theoretic probability. The
construction can be seen as derandomization in game-theoretic probability.
1. Introduction
1.1. Reality’s strategy in Game-theoretic probability. Game-theoretic prob-
ability [18] is a probability theory based on a betting game between two players,
Skeptic and Reality. Sometimes we add the third player called Forecaster. In
game-theoretic probability an almost sure event is (usually) formalized as an event
such that Skeptic can increase his capital to infinity without risking bankruptcy if
the event does not happen. In this case we say that Skeptic has a winning strat-
egy. In game-theoretic probability, in order to prove that an event happens almost
surely, we construct a winning strategy of Skeptic. A number of such strategies
have been constructed so far. Often these strategies of Skeptic correspond to well-
known proofs in measure-theoretic probability that a certain event happens with
probability one.
In this paper, when we just refer to a strategy, it is a deterministic strategy. We
explicitly say “randomized strategy”, when a strategy utilizes random variables in
the sense of measure-theoretic probability.
There is no counterpart of Reality’s strategy in measure-theoretic probability,
because in measure-theoretic probability Reality is simply generating random vari-
ables under a given probability distribution without any specific strategy. Hence it
is more difficult to derive results on Reality’s strategies. Reality’s strategies corre-
spond to the notion of derandomization, since if Reality is following a strategy she
is not random in the measure-theoretic sense.
If a two-player game (without Forecaster) is with perfect information (and the
winning set satisfies some regurality condition), then at least one of the players has
a winning strategy in the game by Martin’s Theorem (Theorem 5.8). If Skeptic does
not have a winning strategy, Reality should have. For instance, consider the game-
theoretic version of Kolmogorov’s strong law of large numbers [18, Proposition 4.1].
Shafer and Vovk proved the existence of Reality’s winning strategy in Section 4.3
in their book [18]. The proof is, however, nonconstructive. The two main tools of
the proof are
(i) the randomized strategy for Reality that was devised by Kolmogorov,
(ii) Martin’s theorem.
It is unnatural that we need to use such a big theorem, Martin’s theorem, to
answer such a simple question. It was a long-standing question to give a concrete
deterministic strategy of Reality.
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Vovk [20] finally gave such a strategy. The proof is simple, which is a desired
property. The proof seems to be based on the randomized strategy by Kolmogorov,
but it is not clear how these two strategies are related. Thus it is difficult to know
from his proof how to modify the randomized strategy to answer a similar question
in different games. On the other hand, Miyabe and Takemura [12] derived a rather
strong result on strategies of Reality. The essential idea is that Reality uses a
“fictional” strategy of Skeptic. In fact, Theorem 4.12 of Miyabe and Takemura [12]
showed the existence of Reality’s strategy. However, they did not give a concrete
strategy. Thus we did not know how the strategy looks like.
In this paper we construct a concrete strategy of Reality based on the idea above.
The construction goes as follows.
[I] Take a randomized strategy.
[II] Construct a strategy of Skeptic that forces the random event.
[III] Construct a strategy of Reality using it.
Each step is straightforward and does not require coming up with a new strategy.
Since we construct a deterministic strategy from a randomized one, we call this
derandomization in game-theoretic probability.
1.2. Derandomization. Randomized algorithm [13, 11] has been frequently used
in complexity theory [7, 1]. One of the reasons is that there are some problems such
that it seems difficult to prove that they are polynomial-time computable but they
are polynomial-time computable with an random oracle with high probability.
The classBPP (Bounded-error Probabilistic Polynomial-time) is, roughly speak-
ing, the set of problems that are polynomial-time computable with a random-
ized algorithm. It has been conjectured that every problem in BPP is actually
polynomial-time computable, that is, BPP = P. In other words, the conjecture is
asking whether we can always derandomize in this setting.
An analogous question in computability theory [3, 15, 16] has been solved. On
Cantor space 2N with the uniform measure µ, if A ∈ 2N is not computable, then
the set of all sequences that compute A has measure 0 [4, 17]. Thus, if a sequence
is computable by a randomized strategy, then the sequence should be computable.
In other words, we can always derandomize if we do not care about computational
resource.
Derandomization asks the question how we can deterministically construct a
sequence random enough. Construction of such a sequence has been studied in
the theory of algorithmic randomness [5, 14] to separate some randomness notions.
The essential idea is diagonalization. One recent interesting application is the
construction of an absolutely normal number in polynomial time [10, 6, 2].
The same technique can be applied to construct a strategy of Reality that com-
plies with an event in game-theoretic probability. Derandomization itself is much
easier in this case because we do not care about computability at all. In contrast, we
need to consider a sequence of reals in our case while derandomization in complex-
ity theory and the theory of algorithmic randomness usually considers an infinite
binary sequence.
1.3. Overview of this paper. The main theme of this paper is the construction
of Reality’s strategy. In Section 3 we study Borel-Cantelli lemmas in game-theoretic
probability. This is a simple case and illustrates how the construction goes. Then,
the result will be used in the next section. In Section 4 we give a deterministic
strategy of Reality that complies with the success and the failure of the strong law
of large numbers. In Section 5 we give a general theory of the notion of compliance
and look at some examples.
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2. Preliminaries
In this paper we mainly consider the unbounded forecasting game defined in
Chapter 4 of Shafer and Vovk [18].
Unbounded Forecasting Game (UFG)
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces mn ∈ R and vn ≥ 0.
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R and Vn ≥ 0.
Reality announces xn ∈ R.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn −mn) + Vn((xn −mn)2 − vn).
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep Kn non-negative. Reality
must keep Kn from tending to infinity.
An infinite sequence ξ = (m1, v1, x1,m2, v2, x2, · · · ) of moves of Forecaster and
Reality is called a path. Define the sample space
Ω = {ξ = (m1, v1, x1,m2, v2, x2, · · · ) : mn ∈ R, vn ≥ 0, xn ∈ R}
as the set of paths. Any subset E ⊆ Ω is called an event. We say that a strategy P
of Skeptic forces an event E if the capital KPn (ξ) of Skeptic with P is non-negative
for all ξ ∈ Ω and for all n ≥ 0, and ξ 6∈ E implies lim supnKPn (ξ) =∞. Skeptic can
force an event if there is a strategy P of Skeptic that forces the event. Note that
we are not distinguishing “weak forcing” and “forcing”, since they are equivalent
([18, Lemma 3.1]).
Definition 2.1 (Miyabe and Takemura [12]). By a strategy R, Reality complies
with an event E ⊆ Ω if
(i) ξ ∈ E, irrespective of the moves of Forecaster and Skeptic, with Skeptic
observing his collateral duty,
(ii) supnKn <∞.
Reality strongly complies with E by the strategy R if (ii) is replaced with Kn ≤ K0
for all n.
Theorem 2.2 (Shafer and Vovk [18, Proposition 4.1]). In the unbounded forecasting
game,
(i) Skeptic can force
∞∑
n=1
vn
n2
<∞⇒ lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi −mi) = 0.
(ii) Reality can comply with
∞∑
n=1
vn
n2
=∞⇒
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi −mi) does not converge to 0
)
.
We call the event of (i) the success of SLLN (Strong Law of Large Numbers)
and the event of (ii) the failure of SLLN. In the proof of (ii), Shafer and Vovk [18,
Proposition 4.1] use a randomized strategy of Reality and Martin’s theorem, but
did not give a concrete strategy. Vovk [20] gave a concrete strategy. The result also
follows from Theorem 4.12 of Miyabe and Takemura [12].
The following is the key fact to give a strategy of Reality.
Theorem 2.3 (Miyabe and Takemura [12, Proposition 4.10]). In the unbounded
forecasting game, if Skeptic can force an event E, then Reality can strongly comply
with E.
DERANDOMIZATION IN GAME-THEORETIC PROBABILITY 4
In the proof of this theorem, a strategy of Reality was constructed using the
strategy of Skeptic that forces the event.
3. Borel-Cantelli lemmas
In this section we focus on game-theoretic versions of Borel-Cantelli lemmas,
which will play an important role to give the strategy of Reality that complies with
the success and the failure of SLLN in the next section.
Coin-Tossing Game
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn − pn).
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep Kn non-negative. Reality
must keep Kn from tending to infinity.
The following result is a game-theoretic version of Le´vy’s extension of the Borel-
Cantelli Lemma.
Proposition 3.1 (Miyabe-Takemura [12, Example 2.3]). In the coin-tossing game
Skeptic can force ∑
n
pn <∞ ⇐⇒
∑
n
xn <∞.(1)
By essentially the same argument in the proof of Theorem 2.3, we can show that
Reality can strongly comply with the event (1). Here we give a concrete strategy.
In Step I, we take a randomized strategy. In measure theoretic probability,
a counterpart of (1) is already shown. Then, we consider the following derived
randomized strategy: xn = 1 with probability pn and xn = 0 with probability
1−pn. Then the property (1) is true almost surely in the sense of measure-theoretic
probability.
In Step II, construct a strategy of Skeptic that forces the random event. Here, the
random event is (1). By the correspondence between measure-theoretic probability
and game-theoretic probability, this is possible by considering a protocol strong
enough. We need a concrete deterministic strategy of Skeptic that forces (1), and
the simpler the better.
Lemma 3.2. In the coin-tossing game, Skeptic can force∑
n
pn =∞⇒
∑
n
xn =∞.
Proof. Let
(2) Hn = {k < n : xk = 1}, Tn = {k < n : xk = 0}
be the sets of time indices of heads and tails before the round n and let
(3) bn = #Hn
denote the number of heads before the round n. Note that for any distinct k, j ∈ Hn,
we have k < j ⇒ bk < bj . Hence
(4)
∑
k∈Hn
2−bk−1 ≤ 1
for every n.
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Consider the following strategy of Skeptic:
Mn = −2−bn−1.
We claim that this strategy forces the event.
First, we show that this strategy keeps Kn non-negative. Note that
Kn = 1−
∑
k∈Hn+1
2−bk−1(1− pk)−
∑
k∈Tn+1
2−bk−1(−pk) > 1−
∑
k∈Hn+1
2−bk−1 ≥ 0.
Next, suppose that
∑
n pn = ∞ and
∑
n xn < ∞. Then, there exists N such
that n ≥ N ⇒ xn = 0. Thus, for every n ≥ N ,
Kn = KN−1 + 2−bN−1
n∑
k=N
pk →∞.

Lemma 3.3. In the coin-tossing game, Skeptic can force∑
n
pn <∞⇒
∑
n
xn <∞.
Proof. Let cn be the natural number satisfying
(5) cn − 1 ≤
n∑
k=1
pk < cn.
Note that ∑
k:ck=i
pk =
∑
k:ck≤i
pk −
∑
k:ck≤i−1
pk < i− (i− 2) = 2.
Consider the following strategy of Skeptic:
Mn = 2
−cn−1.
We claim that this strategy forces the event.
First we show that this strategy keeps Kn non-negative. Note that
∑
k∈Tn+1
2−ck−1pk ≤
∞∑
k=1
2−ck−1pk ≤
∞∑
i=1
∑
k:ck=i
2−i−1pk ≤
∞∑
i=1
2−i ≤ 1,(6)
where Tn is defined in (2). Then
Kn ≥ 1 +
∑
k∈Tn+1
Mk(xk − pk) > 1−
∑
k∈Tn+1
2−ck−1pk ≥ 0.
Next we show that this strategy forces the event. Assume that
∑
n pn < ∞
and
∑
n xn = ∞. Let c be the natural number such that c − 1 <
∑
n pn ≤ c.
Then there exists N0 such that c − 1 <
∑N0
k=1 pk. Note that, for n > N0, we have
c ≤ cn ≤ c+ 1. Since
∑
n pn <∞, there exists N1 such that n ≥ N1 ⇒ pn < 1/2.
Let N = max{N0, N1}. For n ≥ N such that xn = 1, we have
Kn −Kn−1 = 2−cn−1(1 − pn) ≥ 2−c−2 · 1
2
≥ 2−c−3.
For n ≥ N such that xn = 0, we have
Kn −Kn−1 = 2−cn−1(0− pn) ≥ −2−c−1pn.
Since
∑
n pn <∞, we have lim supnKn =∞. 
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In Step III, construct a strategy of Reality using it. First note that Skeptic can
force (1) by combining the strategies in Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3. Using these
strategies, Reality can strongly comply with the same event with the technique of
Theorem 2.3. We give the derived strategy first, and explain how to derive it in
detail later.
Theorem 3.4. In the coin-tossing game, Reality can strongly comply with∑
n
pn <∞ ⇐⇒
∑
n
xn <∞.
Proof. Let bn, cn be defined by (3) and (5). We claim that the following strategy
of Reality strongly complies with the event:
Reality waits for the first round n0 such that Skeptic announces
Mn 6= 0. If such a round does not exist, let n0 =∞.
For n < n0 including the case n0 = ∞, Reality announces xn
as
xn =
{
1 if cn 6= cn−1
0 if cn = cn−1.
For n = n0, Reality announces xn as
xn =
{
1 if Mn < 0
0 if Mn > 0.
If Kn0 = 0, then for n > n0 Reality announces xn as
xn =
{
1 if cn 6= cn−1
0 if cn = cn−1.
If Kn0 > 0, then let
ǫ = 1− Kn0K0 .
For n > n0, Reality announces xn as
xn =
{
1 if Mn ≤ dn
0 if Mn > dn
where
dn =
ǫKn0
1− ǫ (2
−bn−2 − 2−cn−2).(7)
We show that this strategy strongly complies with the event. If n0 = ∞, then
clearly
∑
n pn <∞ if and only if
∑
n xn <∞, and Kn = K0. Then, we can assume
that n0 <∞.
Since Kn0 − Kn0−1 < 0, we have Kn0 < K0. If Kn0 = 0, then Skeptic should
announceMn = 0 for every n > n0 in order to keep Kn non-negative. Thus, Kn = 0
for every n > n0. In this case clearly
∑
n pn <∞ if and only if
∑
n xn <∞.
In what follows, we assume Kn0 > 0. Then 0 < ǫ < 1. Suppose that
∑
n pn =∞
and
∑
n xn < ∞. Since bn is bounded and cn goes to infinity, there exists δ > 0
such that dn > δ and xn = 0 for all sufficiently large n > N . Then for such an n,
we have
Kn = KN −
n∑
k=N+1
Mkpk ≤ KN −
n∑
k=N+1
dkpk
≤ KN −
n∑
k=N+1
δpk → −∞
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as n→∞. Thus, such a strategy of Skeptic is not allowed.
Suppose that
∑
n pn < ∞ and
∑
n xn = ∞. Since cn is bounded, bn goes to
infinity and pn goes to 0, there exists δ > 0 such that dn < −δ and pn ≤ 1/2 for
all sufficiently large n > N . For n > N such that xn = 1,
Kn −Kn−1 =Mn(1 − pn) ≤ dn(1− pn) ≤ −δ(1− pn) ≤ − δ
2
.
For n > N such that xn = 0, we have
Mn > dn ≥ −2−cn−2 ǫKn0
1− ǫ ,
and
Kn −Kn−1 = −Mnpn ≤ 2−cn−2 ǫKn0
1− ǫpn.
Thus, Kn → −∞ and such a strategy of Skeptic is not allowed.
Finally we show that supnKn ≤ 1. Since we have K0 = (1− ǫ)Kn0 , it suffices to
show that
Kn ≤ Kn0
1− ǫ = Kn0 +
ǫKn0
1− ǫ .
For n ≥ n0 such that xn = 1, we have
Kn −Kn−1 ≤Mn(1− pn) ≤ dn ≤ ǫKn0
1− ǫ2
−bn−2.
For n ≥ n0 such that xn = 0, we have
Kn −Kn−1 = −Mnpn ≤ ǫKn0
1− ǫ2
−cn−2pn.
By (4) and (6), we have Kn −Kn0 ≤
ǫKn0
1− ǫ . 
From now on we explain how we derived the above strategy. The goal is to
construct a strategy of Reality that complies with the event E of
∑
n pn <∞ ⇐⇒∑
n xn < ∞. It suffices to give a strategy with which Reality’s move is “random”
in the following two senses:
(a) The capital is bounded.
(b) The path satisfies the almost-sure property E.
The meaning of randomness in measure-theoretic probability is not clear. In the
theory of algorithmic randomness, one formulation of randomness is finiteness of the
capital for all betting strategies that are effective in some sense. In game-theoretic
probability, randomness of a path means the finiteness of the capital in the game.
For instance, Vovk and Shen [21] have used the terminology of “game-random”.
With this view, we express the property (b) by the finiteness of the capital with
respect to the strategy with which Skeptic can force the event E.
By the proof of Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, the following strategy F of Skeptic
forces the event E:
Mn = 2
−cn−2 − 2−bn−2.
Reality uses this strategy F as a fictional strategy. We denote by S the real strategy
of Skeptic. In order to comply with the event E, all Reality has to do is to make
the capital with the strategy (S+F )/2 finite. Note that the finiteness of the capital
with (S + F )/2 implies the finiteness of the capital with S and the capital with F .
Furthermore, the finiteness of the capital with F implies the event E because F
forces the event E. The strategy O = (S + F )/2 announces
MOn =
MSn + 2
−cn−2 − 2−bn−2
2
.
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Reality can make KOn ≤ KOn−1 by announcing
xn =
{
1 if MOn ≤ 0
0 if MOn > 0.
Note that
MOn ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ MSn ≤ 2−bn−2 − 2−cn−2.
Then this strategy complies with the event E. Notice that this strategy gives the
essential part of dn in (7) in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
To give a strategy that “strongly” complies with the event, we need an additional
little trick. The idea is taken from the proof of Proposition 4.10 in [12]. A rough
idea is as follows. Wait until the round n0 satisfying Mn0 6= 0 so that Reality can
make the capital strictly less than the initial capital. Let 1− ǫ be the ratio of the
capital at n0 and the initial capital. After the round n0, Reality only has to make
the capital with (1− ǫ)S + ǫF non-increasing. The derived strategy is the strategy
in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
4. Derandomization in the Unbounded Forecasting Game and its
generalization
In this section we give Reality’s strategies complying with the success and the
failure of the strong law of large numbers at the same time in the Unbounded
Forecasting Game and its generalization.
4.1. A strategy of Reality for the Unbounded Forecasting Game.
Theorem 4.1. In the unbounded forecasting game, Reality can strongly comply
with ∑
n
vn
n2
<∞ ⇐⇒ lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi −mi) = 0.
Note that this theorem implies (ii) of Theorem 2.2. We show this by giving
a concrete strategy of Reality. In what follows, we assume mn = 0 for every n
without loss of generality.
In Step I, we take a randomized strategy. In measure-theoretic probability,
the failure of SLLN was shown by the following randomized strategy devised by
Kolmogorov [8]: if vn < n
2,
xn :=

 n−n
0

 with probability

 vn/(2n2)vn/(2n2)
1− vn/n2

 ,
respectively; if vn ≥ n2,
xn :=
( √
vn
−√vn
)
with probability
(
1/2
1/2
)
.
Here, to show the non-convergence, the second part of the Borel-Cantelli lemmas
is used. In contrast, if
∑
n vn/n
2 <∞, then by the first part of the Borel-Cantelli
lemma, SLLN holds almost surely.
In Step II, construct a strategy of Skeptic that forces the random event. Moti-
vated by the strategy above, we restrict xn ∈ {0,±n} if vn < n2, and xn ∈ {±√vn}
if vn ≥ n2. Since the property holds almost surely in the sense of measure-theoretic
probability, it is possible to construct a strategy of Skeptic that forces the event
with this restriction. With the restriction, the strategy we need to construct is the
one of Skeptic that forces∑
n
vn
n2
<∞ ⇐⇒ xn = 0 for all but finitely many n.
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Such a strategy of Skeptic can be constructed by modifying the strategy constructed
in the previous section.
In Step III, construct a strategy of Reality using it. By the technique explained in
the previous section, we can construct a strategy of Reality that strongly complies
with the event with the restriction, which means that Reality can strongly comply
with the event without the restriction.
In the following proof, we only give the final derived strategy of Reality.
We can forget the round n such that vn = 0 by letting xn = 0. Thus, we assume
that vn > 0 for every n.
Proof. We claim that the following strategy of Reality strongly complies with the
event:
Let
bn = #{k < n : xk 6= 0}
and cn be the natural number satisfying
cn − 1 ≤
n∑
k=1
vk
k2
< cn.
Reality waits for the first round n0 such that Skeptic announces
(Mn, Vn) 6= (0, 0). If such a round does not exist, let n0 =∞.
For n < n0 including the case n0 =∞, Reality announces xn as
xn =
{
n if cn 6= cn−1
0 if cn = cn−1.
For n = n0, Reality announces xn as
xn =


1 if Vn = 0 and Mn < 0
−1 if Vn = 0 and Mn > 0
0 if Vn > 0.
If Kn0 = 0, then for n > n0 Reality announces xn as
xn =
{
n if cn 6= cn−1
0 if cn = cn−1.
If Kn0 > 0, let
ǫ = 1− Kn0K0 .
For n > n0 Reality announces xn as
xn =


n if vn < n
2, Vn ≤ dn and Mn < 0
−n if vn < n2, Vn ≤ dn and Mn ≥ 0
0 if vn < n
2, Vn > dn√
vn if vn ≥ n2 and Mn < 0
−√vn if vn ≥ n2 and Mn ≥ 0,
where
dn =
ǫKn0
1− ǫ
2−bn−2 − 2−cn−2
n2
.
We show that this strategy strongly complies with the event. If n0 = ∞, then
clearly
∑
n vn/n
2 <∞ if and only if xn = 0 for all but finitely many n, and Kn = K0
for every n. Then, we can assume that n0 <∞.
Consider the round n = n0. If Vn = 0, then
Kn0 −Kn0−1 = −|Mn| < 0.
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If Vn > 0, then
Kn0 −Kn0−1 = −Vnvn < 0.
Thus, Kn0 < K0.
If Kn0 = 0, then Skeptic should announce (Mn, Vn) = (0, 0) for every n > n0 in
order to keep Kn non-negative. Thus, Kn = 0 for every n > n0. In this case clearly∑
n vn/n
2 <∞ if and only if xn = 0 for all but finitely many n.
In what follows we assume Kn0 > 0. Then 0 < ǫ < 1.
Suppose that
∑
n vn/n
2 = ∞ and xn = 0 for all but finitely many n. Since
bn is bounded and cn goes to infinity, there exists δ such that dn > δ/n
2 for all
sufficiently large n > N . Then, for such an n,
Kn = KN −
n∑
k=N+1
Vkvk ≤ KN −
n∑
k=N0+1
dkvk
≤ KN −
n∑
k=N+1
δ · vk
k2
→ −∞
as n→∞. Thus, such a strategy of Skeptic is not allowed.
Suppose that
∑
n vn/n
2 < ∞ and xn 6= 0 for infinitely many n. Since cn is
bounded and bn goes to infinity, dn is negative for all sufficiently large n. Since∑
n vn/n
2 <∞, we have vn < n2 for all sufficiently large n. Thus, xn should be 0
for all sufficiently large n. This is a contradiction.
Finally we show that supnKn ≤ 1. It suffices to show that Kn ≤ Kn0 + ǫKn01−ǫ .
For n ≥ n0 such that vn < n2 and Vn ≤ dn, we have
Kn −Kn−1 ≤ Vn(x2n − vn) ≤ dnn2 ≤
ǫKn0
1− ǫ2
−bn−2.
For n ≥ n0 such that vn < n2 and Vn > dn, we have
Kn −Kn−1 = −Vnvn ≤ 0.
For n ≥ n0 such that vn ≥ n2, we have
Kn −Kn−1 ≤ Vn(x2n − vn) = 0.
Thus, Kn −Kn0 ≤
ǫKn0
1− ǫ . 
4.2. A strategy of Reality in a generalization of the Unbounded Fore-
casting Game. There are some possible ways in which we generalize our result
for the Unbounded Forecasting Game. Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi [9] have
obtained similar results in a game which generalizes the Unbounded Forecasting
Game. Miyabe and Takemura [12] have shown the existence of the strategy that
strongly complies with the failure of SLLN in a rather general setting. Here, we
give a stronger result in the general setting in the following senses.
(i) We give a concrete deterministic strategy.
(ii) The strategy strongly complies with the success and the failure of SLLN
at the same time.
(iii) We use weaker assumptions.
(iv) The strategy is much simpler.
The following protocol is from Section 5 in Miyabe and Takemura [12].
Unbounded Forecasting Game with General Hedge (UFGH)
Parameters: A single function h : R→ R
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
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FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces mn ∈ R and vn ≥ 0.
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R and Vn ≥ 0.
Reality announces xn ∈ R.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn −mn) + Vn(h(xn −mn)− vn).
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep Kn non-negative. Reality
must keep Kn from tending to infinity.
Assumption
(A0) h(x) = h(|x|) ≥ 0.
(A1) h(x)/x is monotone increasing for x > 0.
(A2) h(x)/x2 is monotone decreasing for x > 0.
(A3) h(x) = x2 for |x| ≤ 1.
Here, we are taking into account Remark 5.3 of [12].
Theorem 4.2 (Theorem 5.9 in [12]). Suppose that h satisfies (A0)-(A3) and that g
is a positive increasing function. Then in UFGH, Reality can strongly comply with∑
n
vn
g(An)
=∞⇒
n∑
k=1
xk −mk
h−1 ◦ g(Ak) does not converge.
Theorem 4.3 (Theorem 5.10 in [12]). Let h(x) = xr where 1 ≤ r ≤ 2 and g be a
positive increasing function. Then in UFGH, Reality can strongly comply with∑
n
vn
g(An)
=∞⇒
∑n
k=1(xk −mk)
h−1 ◦ g(An) does not converge.
We consider a slightly weaker condition by replacing (A3) by (A4) below, but
(A4) is cricital to show the strong compliance. See Remark 4.7 for details.
Assumption
(A4) h(0) = 0.
From now on we show the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that h satisfies (A0)-(A2), (A4) and that g is a positive
increasing function. Then in UFGH, Reality can strongly comply with∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞ ⇐⇒
∑n
k=1(xk −mk)
h−1 ◦ g(An) converges.(8)
Note that Theorem 4.4 implies the two theorems above. Theorem 4.4 also implies
Proposition 2.1 in [9] by letting mn = 0, vn = v, h(x) = x
r and g(x) = x/v.
Furthermore, Theorem 4.4 also implies Proposition 3.1 in [9] by letting mn = 0,
vn = v and g(x) = h(vx).
In what follows, without loss of generality, we assume that mn = 0 for every n.
Furthermore, we can forget the round n such that vn = 0 by letting xn = 0. Thus,
we assume that vn > 0 for every n.
Before giving the strategy, we recall the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 (Miyabe and Takemura [12, Lemma 4.15]). Let {an} be a sequence of
positive reals. Then there exists a sequence {ǫn} of positive reals such that
(i) ǫn is determined only by a1, · · · , an,
(ii) ǫnan ≤ 1,
(iii)
∑
n an =∞ implies
∑
n ǫnan =∞ and ǫn → 0.
Furthermore, by the proof, we can assume that
(iv)
∑
n an <∞ implies that {ǫn} converges to a positive real.
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Now we are ready to give the strategy.
In UFGH, we consider the following strategy of Reality:
Let
bn = #{k < n : xk 6= 0}
and cn be the natural number satisfying
cn − 1 ≤
n∑
k=1
ǫkvk
g(Ak)
< cn
where {ǫn} is the sequence determined by Lemma 4.5 for {vn/g(An)}.
Reality waits for the first round n0 such that Skeptic announces
(Mn, Vn) 6= (0, 0). If such a round does not exist, n0 =∞.
For n < n0 including the case n0 =∞, Reality announces xn as
xn =
{
en if cn 6= cn−1
0 if cn = cn−1.
where
en = h
−1(g(An) · ǫ−1n ).
For n = n0, Reality announces xn as
xn =


1 if Vn = 0 and Mn < 0
−1 if Vn = 0 and Mn > 0
0 if Vn > 0.
If Kn0 = 0, then for n > n0 Reality announces xn as
xn =
{
en if cn 6= cn−1
0 if cn = cn−1.
If Kn0 > 0, let
ǫ = 1− Kn0K0 .
For n > n0 Reality announces xn as
xn =


en if ǫnvn < g(An), Vn ≤ dn and Mn < 0
−en if ǫnvn < g(An), Vn ≤ dn and Mn ≥ 0
0 if ǫnvn < g(An), Vn > dn
h−1(vn) if ǫnvn ≥ g(An) and Mn < 0
−h−1(vn) if ǫnvn ≥ g(An) and Mn ≥ 0
where
dn =
ǫKn0
1− ǫ
2−bn−2 − 2−cn−2
g(An) · ǫ−1n
.
We show that this strategy strongly complies with the success and the failure of
SLLN at the same time. In the proof we use the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6 (Miyabe and Takemura [12, Lemma 4.14]). Let {yn} be a sequence of
reals and let {gn} be a non-decreasing sequence of positive reals. If (
∑
k≤n yk)/gn
converges to d, then |yn/gn| ≤ |d|+ 1 for all but finitely many n.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. By a similar argument as the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can
show that Reality can strongly comply with∑
n
vn
g(An)
<∞ ⇐⇒
∑
n
ǫnvn
g(An)
<∞ ⇐⇒ xn = 0 for all but finitely many n
except the following two places.
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(1) The capital of the case such that
∑
n vn/g(An) = ∞ and xn = 0 for all but
finitely many n is as follows:
Kn =KN −
n∑
k=N+1
Vkvk ≤ KN −
n∑
k=N+1
dkvk
≤KN −
n∑
k=N+1
δ · ǫkvk
g(Ak)
→ −∞.
(2) For n ≥ n0 such that xn 6= 0, we have
Kn −Kn−1 ≤Vn(h(en)− vn) ≤ dn · h(en)
≤ ǫKn0
1− ǫ ·
2−bn−2
g(An) · ǫ−1n
· g(An) · ǫ−1n =
ǫKn0
1− ǫ · 2
−bn−2
if ǫnvn < g(An), and Kn −Kn−1 ≤ 0 if ǫnvn ≥ g(An).
From now on, we show that xn = 0 for all but finitely many n if and only if∑n
k=1 xk/h
−1 ◦ g(An) converges.
Suppose that xn = 0 for all but finitely many n and limnAn <∞. Then,
∑
n xn
converges and h−1 ◦ g(An) converges. Thus,
∑n
k=1 xk/h
−1 ◦ g(An) converges.
Suppose that xn = 0 for all but finitely many n and limnAn =∞. Then,
∑
n xn
converges and limn h
−1 ◦ g(An) =∞. Thus,
∑n
k=1 xk/h
−1 ◦ g(An) converges to 0.
Suppose that xn 6= 0 for infinitely many n. This means that
|xn| =
{
en if ǫnvn < g(An)
h−1(vn) if ǫnvn ≥ g(An)
for infinitely many n. Note that, if ǫnvn ≥ g(An), then h−1(vn) ≥ h−1(g(An) · ǫ−1n )
by the monotonicity of h. Thus,
|xn|
h−1 ◦ g(An) ≥
h−1(g(An) · ǫ−1n )
h−1 ◦ g(An)
for infinitely many n. We claim that the right-hand side goes to infinity. Then, by
Lemma 4.6,
∑n
k=1 xk/h
−1 ◦ g(An) does not converge.
Since ǫn → 0 as n→∞, we have
g(An) ≤ g(An) · ǫ−1n
for all sufficiently large n. Since h is non-decreasing, so is h−1 and
h−1(g(An)) ≤ h−1(g(An) · ǫ−1n ).
By Assumption (A2), we have
g(An)
(h−1(g(An)))2
≥ g(An) · ǫ
−1
n
(h−1(g(An) · ǫ−1n ))2
,
which implies that
h−1(g(An) · ǫ−1n )
h−1 ◦ g(An) ≥ ǫ
−1/2
n →∞.

Remark 4.7. Notice that Assumption (A4) is used to show that Kn0 < K0. At the
round n = n0, if Vn > 0, then xn = 0 and
Kn0 −Kn0−1 = Vn(h(0)− vn),
which is negative because h(0) = 0.
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5. On the notion of Compliance
In this section we give a general theory on compliance. We consider the un-
bounded forecasting game or the coin-tossing game, but most theorems can be
applied to a similar game.
5.1. The strength of compliance. Recall Theorem 2.3, which says that Reality
can strongly comply with the event that Skeptic can force. An interpretation of this
fact in the usual notion of probability is like this: For each event with probability
1, one can deterministically take a path in the event. Clearly, the probability of the
event is closely related to the supremum of the capital of Skeptic. The strongness of
the compliance seems to be due to probability 1 of the event. With this motivation
we study the relation between the notion of compliance and the upper and lower
probability.
We denote strategies of Forecaster, Skeptic and Reality by F , S and R respec-
tively.
Definition 5.1 (Shafer and Vovk [18, Chapter 8.3]). The upper probability of an
event E is defined as
P (E) = inf{a | (∃S)(∀F )(∀R)K0 = a & E ⇒ sup
n
Kn ≥ 1},
where S needs to keep the capital non-negative. The lower probability is defined as
P (E) = 1− P (Ec).
The following are some properties of P and P .
Proposition 5.2 (see [18, Proposition 8.12]). Skeptic can force an event E if and
only if P (E) = 1.
The “only if” direction holds because the convex combination of strategies of
Skeptic is possible in the game.
Proposition 5.3 (see [18, Proposition 8.10]). The upper probability P is an outer
measure and the lower probability P is an inner measure.
Proposition 5.4 (see [19, Lemma 1]). For every event E, we have
0 ≤ P (E) ≤ P (E) ≤ 1.
We define a similar function based on the notion of compliance.
Definition 5.5. For an event E, let
Q(E) = sup{a | (∃R)(∀F )(∀S)K0 = a⇒ E ∧ sup
n
Kn ≤ 1}.
Let
Q(E) = 1−Q(Ec).
The following are immediate by definition.
Proposition 5.6. If Reality can strongly comply with E, then Q(E) = 1.
Proposition 5.7. If Q(E) > 0, then Reality can comply with E.
A two-player game is called determined if one of the player has a winning strategy.
Theorem 5.8 (Martin’s theorem; see [18, Chapter 4.6]). If the winning condition
is Borel, then the game is determined.
Remark 5.9. In fact, Martin’s theorem says that quasi-Borel is enough.
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If Forecaster is not a player in the game, then the game is with perfect infor-
mation. Then, by Martin’s theorem, we can show that Q is equal to P in this
case.
Theorem 5.10. Consider that Forecaster’s strategy is fixed in advance and Borel.
If E is Borel, then P (E) = Q(E) and P (E) = Q(E).
Proof. Suppose the game whose winning condition Ca of Skeptic is
K0 = a ∧ E ⇒ sup
n
Kn ≥ 1.
This condition can be written as
A ∧
(
Ec ∨
∧
m
∨
n
Bn,m
)
where A is K0 = a and Bn,m is Kn ≥ 1 − 2−m. Note that A and Bn,m are
Borel. Recall that the class of Borel sets is closed under countable union, countable
intersection and complement. Thus, the condition is Borel for each a.
Consider P (E) = x > 0, and let ǫ be a positive real small enough. If K0 = x− ǫ,
then no strategy S can guarantee to win. Then Reality has a winning strategy by
Martin’s theorem. It follows that Q(E) ≥ x = P (E).
By a similar argument, by interchansing the roles of the players, we can show
Q(E) ≤ P (E). Hence Q(E) = P (E).
Consider P (E) = 0. Then for each x > 0 there exists a strategy S such that
K0 < x/2 and E ⇒ supnKn ≥ 1. Thus, the strategy 2S forces K0 < x and
E ⇒ supnKn > 1. This means that no Reality’s strategy complies with K0 < x
and E ⇒ supnKn ≤ 1. Hence, Q(E) ≤ x. Since x is arbitrary, we have Q(E) = 0.
Since E is Borel, then so is Ec. Note that P (Ec) = Q(Ec). Then P (E) =
Q(E). 
As we will see in Corollary 5.17, we do not have Q(E) ≤ Q(E) or Q(E) ≥ Q(E)
in general. Thus, we introduce the convex closure of them as follows:
conv[Q(E), Q(E)] =
{
[Q(E), Q(E)] if Q(E) ≤ Q(E)
[Q(E), Q(E)] if Q(E) > Q(E).
Theorem 2.3 says that, in our terminology,
P (E) = 1⇒ Q(E) = 1.
By a little modification, we can show the following.
Proposition 5.11. Let E be an event.
(i) The intervals conv[Q(E), Q(E)] and [P (E), P (E)] always overlap.
(ii) Q(E) < Q(E) is only possible when they are nested:
conv[Q(E), Q(E)] ⊆ [P (E), P (E)].
Proof. It suffices to show that
P (E) ≤ Q(E) and Q(E) ≤ P (E).
We can assume P (E) = x > 0. Then P (Ec) = 1 − x. Hence there exists S such
that KS0 = 1− x+ ǫ, and Ec ⇒ supnKSn ≥ 1 for small enough ǫ > 0.
Now consider a strategy T of Skeptic such that KT0 = x − 2ǫ. Then S + T
is a strategy such that KS+T0 = 1 − ǫ. Hence Reality has the strategy satisfying
supnKS+Tn ≤ 1 − ǫ. It follows that supnKSn ≤ 1 − ǫ and supnKTn ≤ 1 − ǫ. Since
Ec ⇒ supnKSn ≥ 1, we have E. Then this strategy is the witness of Q(E) ≥ x.
Hence P (E) ≤ Q(E). Considering Ec, we also have Q(E) ≤ P (E). 
DERANDOMIZATION IN GAME-THEORETIC PROBABILITY 16
Corollary 5.12. If P (E) > 0, then Reality can comply with E.
5.2. Examples.
5.2.1. Coin-tossing game. In the following we look at some examples. Some exam-
ples show the difference between P and Q.
Example 5.13. In the coin-tossing game, let E be the event that Sn =
∑n
k=1 xk
is finite. Then,
P (E) = 0, P (E) = 1, Q(E) = 1, Q(E) = 0.
Skeptic can not force E or Ec. Reality can not comply with E or Ec.
Note that E is a tail event.
Proof. First, we claim that P (E) = 0. Assume that K0 < 1. Consider the case that
K0 <
∏∞
n=1 pn < 1 and xn = 1 for every n. Since Skeptic needs to keep Kn ≥ 0,
we have Kn−1 +Mn(0− pn) ≥ 0, thus Mn ≤ Kn−1pn . Then,
Kn = Kn−1 +Mn(1− pn) ≤ Kn−1 + 1− pn
pn
Kn−1 = Kn−1
pn
≤ K0∏n
i=1 pi
.
Thus, supnKn ≤ K0∏∞
n=1
pn
< 1. Hence P (Ec) = 1 and P (E) = 0.
We claim that P (E) = 1. Assume that K0 < 1. Consider the case that K0 <∏∞
n=1(1 − pn) < 1 and xn = 0 for every n. By an argument similar to above, Mn
must satisfy −Mn ≤ Kn−11−pn and supnKn ≤
K0∏
∞
n=1
(1−pn)
< 1. Hence P (E) = 0.
Since P (E) = 0 and P (Ec) = 0, Skeptic can not force E or Ec.
We claim that Q(E) = 1. Consider the case that
∑
n pn < ∞ and Skeptic uses
a strategy that forces
∑
n pn <∞⇒ Sn <∞. Then supnKn =∞ if K0 > 0. This
means that Q(Ec) = 0 and Q(E) = 1.
Similarly, we have Q(E) = 0 because Skeptic can force
∑
n pn =∞⇒ Sn =∞.
Consider the case that
∑
n pn = ∞ and Skeptic uses a strategy that forces∑
n pn = ∞ ⇒ limn Sn = ∞. In order to make supnKn < ∞, Reality needs to
announce {xn} so that limn Sn =∞. This means that Reality can not comply with
E. A similar argument can be applied for Ec. 
Corollary 5.14. The function Q is not an outer measure in general and Q is not
an inner measure in general.
Proof. In Example 5.13, we have Q(E) = Q(Ec) = 0 and Q(E∪Ec) = 1. Thus, the
inequality Q(A∪B) ≤ Q(A)+Q(B) does not hold even if A and B are disjoint. 
Example 5.15. In coin-tossing game, let E be the event that
p1 > 0⇒ x1 = 1.
Then,
P (E) = 0, P (E) = 1, Q(E) = 1, Q(E) = 0.
Skeptic can not force E or Ec. Reality can comply with E but can not comply with
Ec.
Proof. We claim that P (E) = 1. Assume K0 < 1. Consider the case that p1 =
x1 = 1. Then, K1 = K0 < 1. Thus, no strategy of Skeptic gurantees supnKn ≥ 1
even if Ec happens. Hence, P (Ec) = 1 and P (E) = 0.
We claim that P (E) = 1. Assume K0 < 1. Consider the case that p1 = x1 = 0.
Then, K1 = K0 < 1. Thus, no strategy of Skeptic gurantees supnKn ≥ 1 even if E
happens. Hence, P (E) = 1.
Since P (E) = 0 and P (Ec) = 0, Skeptic can not force E or Ec.
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We claim that Q(E) = 1. Consider the case that p1 = 0. Then, E
c can not
happen. Hence, Reality can not comply with Ec, Q(Ec) = 0 and Q(E) = 1.
We claim that Q(E) = 0. Assume K0 > 0. Consider the case that p1 = K0/2
and M1 = 2. Then, the capital K1 for x1 = 0 is
K1 = K0 + 2(0− p1) = 0
and the capital K1 for x1 = 1 is
K1 = K0 + 2(1− p1) = 2.
Thus, Q(E) = 0.
We claim that Reality can comply with E. Consider the following strategy of
Reality:
x1 =
{
0 if p1 = 0
1 if p1 > 0
, xn =
{
0 if Mn ≥ 0
1 if Mn < 0.
Then, supnKn = K1 < ∞. Notice that this strategy gurantees that E happens.
Hence, Reality can comply with E. 
Recall that, if Q(E) is positive, then Reality can comply with E. Example 5.15
shows that the converse does not hold.
5.2.2. Bounded forecasting game.
Bounded Forecasting Game
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ [0, 1].
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn − pn).
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep Kn non-negative. Reality
must keep Kn from tending to infinity.
Example 5.16. In the bounded forecasting game, let E be the event that xn = pn
for infinitely many n. Then,
P (E) = 0, P (E) = 1, Q(E) = 0, Q(E) = 1.
Skeptic can not force E or Ec. Reality can comply with E and Ec. In contrast,
Reality can not strongly comply with Ec.
Proof. We claim that P (E) = 0. Assume K0 < 1. Consider the case that pn = 1/2
for every n and
xn =
{
1 if Mn ≤ 0
0 if Mn > 0.
Then, Ec happens but supnKn ≤ K0 < 1. Hence, P (Ec) = 1 and P (E) = 0.
We claim that P (E) = 1. Assume K0 < 1. Consider the case that pn = xn = 1/2
for every n. Then, E happns but supnKn ≤ K0 < 1. Hence, P (E) = 1.
Since P (E) = P (Ec) = 0, Skeptic can not force E or Ec.
We claim that Q(E) = 0. Assume K0 < 1. Let q be a rational such that
K0 < q < 1. Consider the following strategy of Reality: for every n,
(i) if pn = 0, then take xn > 0 so that Mnxn ≤ q−Kn−12 ,
(ii) if pn = 1, then take xn < 1 so that Mn(xn − 1) ≤ q−Kn−12 ,
(iii) if pn ∈ (0, 1) and Mn ≤ 0, then xn = 1,
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(iv) if pn ∈ (0, 1) and Mn > 0, then xn = 0.
Then, inductively, we have
Kn = Kn−1 +Mn(xn − pn) ≤ Kn−1 + q −Kn−1
2
=
q +Kn−1
2
.
Hence, supnKn ≤ q < 1. This means that Q(Ec) = 1 and Q(E) = 0. By Q(Ec) >
0, Reality can comply with E.
We claim that Q(E) = 1. This is verified by considering the strategy of Reality
that just announces xn = pn for every n. By Q(E) > 0, Reality can comply with
E.
Finally, we claim that Reality can not strongly comply with Ec. Consider the
case that pn = 0 and Mn = 1 for every n. Notice that Skeptic can keep Kn ≥ 0 by
this strategy. To keep Kn ≤ K0 for every n, Reality needs to announce xn = 0 for
every n. This means that Reality can not strongly comply with Ec. 
Corollary 5.17. The function Q is not an inner measure in general and Q is not
an outer measure in general.
Proof. Notice that Q(E) = Q(Ec) = Q(E ∪ Ec) = 1. 
Corollary 5.18. We do not have Q(E) ≤ Q(E) or Q(E) ≥ Q(E) in general.
Proof. This is by Example 5.13 and Example 5.16. 
Recall that, if Reality can strongly comply with a event E, then Q(E) = 1.
Example 5.16 shows that the converse does not hold.
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